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This paper examines the economic consequences of SEC disclosure regulation. We exploit a 
recent regulatory change mandating firms on the OTC Bulletin Board to comply with the 
reporting requirements under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This change substantially 
increases the amount and enforcement of required disclosures for firms that previously did not 
file with the SEC. In this unique setting, we document that the imposition of SEC disclosure 
requirements and enforcement results in significant costs for smaller firms, which are essentially 
forced off the OTCBB. However, SEC disclosure regulation also has significant benefits. Firms 
already filing with the SEC prior to the rule change experience positive stock returns and 
permanent increases in market liquidity. This evidence is consistent with positive externalities 
from disclosure regulation. Moreover, newly compliant firms exhibit significant increases in 
market liquidity upon compliance consistent with the notion that commitment to higher-quality 
disclosures increases market liquidity. 
JEL classification:  G18, G38, K22, G39, M44, G14 
Key Words:  Mandatory disclosure, Enforcement, Externalities, Over-the-counter market, 
Liquidity, Listing choices, Eligibility rule 
We would like to thank Stan Baiman, Sudipta Basu, John Core, Leslie Hodder, Alan Jagolinzer, Mike Kirchenheiter, 
SP Kothari, Bill Tyson, Laurence van Lent, Ro Verrecchia, Greg Waymire, Joe Weber, Peter Wysocki, and the 
anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. The paper has benefited from presentations at the EAA 
meetings in Copenhagen, Emory University, University of North Carolina, Oklahoma State University, Penn State 
University, Securities and Exchange Commission (OEA), Tulane University, Winter Accounting Conference 
(University of Utah), and the Wharton School.  We are particularly thankful to Yim Cheung (Pink Sheets) and Greg 
Ballard (Knobias) for generously providing data for our study.  In addition, we are grateful to Liz Hesse (NASDAQ) 
and numerous market makers for helpful discussions of institutional details, and Gerry Cooke (Thomson Financial 
Datastream) and Pete Healy (Mergent) for their assistance with data issues. Finally, we thank Brian Lempel, Darwin 
Rodriguez, and Richard Clattenburg for their research assistance.   1
1. Introduction 
Extensive SEC disclosure regulation and associated enforcement are often viewed as 
cornerstones of US capital markets (e.g., Sutton, 1997; Levitt, 1998).  However, there is 
surprisingly little empirical evidence on the alleged costs and benefits of disclosure regulation 
(see also Healy and Palepu, 2001).  Moreover, the economic consequences of mandatory 
disclosures are theoretically far from clear and heavily debated (e.g., Coffee, 1984; Easterbrook 
and Fischel, 1984). 
We contribute evidence to this debate by examining firm-specific consequences of SEC 
disclosure regulation for a sizable and previously unregulated US market segment.
1  We exploit a 
recent regulatory change mandating firms quoted on the Over-The-Counter Bulletin Board 
(OTCBB) to comply with the reporting requirements under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.  
We study firms’ responses and market reactions, but do not attempt to evaluate the regulator’s 
decision or to measure the net social costs or benefits. 
We find that the imposition of SEC disclosure requirements forces a substantial number of 
firms into a less regulated market, at significant costs in terms of market value and liquidity.  
Only a small set of firms finds it optimal to newly adopt SEC disclosures, thereby avoiding 
removal from the OTCBB.  Even though these firms experience significant increases in liquidity 
upon compliance, stock returns suggest that the regulatory change is costly to these firms.  Our 
evidence further suggests that these two effects create positive externalities for OTCBB firms 
that were already compliant with SEC disclosure requirements, possibly due to informational or 
liquidity spillovers or due to an enhanced reputation of the OTCBB. 
                                                 
1   By disclosure regulation, we mean mandatory reporting obligations as a prerequisite for trading in a particular 
market and the enforcement of these obligations.  Such regulation may take place at the exchange level in the 
form of (private) listing requirements or at the country level in the form of (public) disclosure laws.   2
On January 4, 1999, the SEC approved the eligibility rule,” which required all domestic 
OTCBB firms to comply with the reporting obligations under the 1934 Act by a firm-specific 
phase-in date between July 1999 and June 2000.  Prior to this rule, firms could be traded on the 
OTCBB without SEC filing if they (1) had $10 million or less in total assets or fewer than 500 
shareholders and (2) had avoided registering securities under the 1933 Securities Act (see 
Section 2 for more details).  They merely had to provide financial statements to a market maker 
once to initiate quotation, but not subsequently.  Prior to the eligibility rule, the OTCBB quoted 
over 3,600 firms that did not file with the SEC.  For these firms, the new rule substantially 
extended the disclosures required for trading in the OTCBB. 
In essence, the regulatory change created three firm groups.  Firms that were not filing with 
the SEC prior to the eligibility rule presumably did so because the costs exceeded the benefits, as 
they could have voluntarily filed with the SEC.  By eliminating the possibility to trade on the 
OTCBB without filing, the eligibility rule essentially forces firms to choose their next-best 
alternative.  Firms that do not to comply with SEC reporting are removed from OTCBB 
(“Noncompliant” firms).  These firms have to go private or trade in the Pink Sheets, where SEC 
filing is not required.  Firms that prefer to continue trading in the OTCBB must adopt SEC 
disclosures (“Newly Compliant” firms).  Thus, the compliance responses of both groups, and the 
market reactions to them, provide evidence on firm-specific costs and benefits from the 
imposition of mandatory disclosures.  Firms that were already subject to SEC reporting 
obligations, either due to their size and number of shareholders or due to prior securities 
offerings under 1933 Act, were not directly affected by the eligibility rule (“Already Compliant” 
firms).  These firms provide an opportunity to study externalities of disclosure regulation.   3
First, we analyze firms’ compliance responses to the eligibility rule.  We document that over 
2,600 (or 74%) of the firms not previously filing with the SEC did not comply with the required 
disclosures and hence were removed from the OTCBB.  Thus, for the vast majority of OTCBB 
firms, the costs of mandatory SEC disclosures appear to outweigh the benefits.  We also examine 
firm characteristics, such as size, ownership structure, outside financing needs, and profitability, 
which are typically associated with the costs and benefits of disclosures (e.g., Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993 and 2000).  As expected, we find that Noncompliant firms are smaller, have 
lower leverage, and higher profitability than Newly Compliant firms.  These results have to be 
interpreted cautiously as data availability prior to the eligibility rule is limited, but they suggest 
that an important consequence of mandatory SEC disclosures is to push smaller firms with lower 
outside financing needs into a less regulated market, rather than to compel them to adopt higher 
disclosure standards. 
Next, we examine stock returns around the announcement and implementation of the 
eligibility rule.  If the market anticipates the economic consequences of the disclosure 
requirements, returns around the key announcement dates provide evidence of firms’ net costs or 
benefits.  Similarly, returns around the rule’s phase-in dates, when the remaining residual 
uncertainty about firms’ compliance is resolved, reflect the market’s assessments of the costs or 
benefits resulting from the imposition of SEC disclosures. 
We find positive abnormal returns for Already Compliant firms around key announcements 
and phase-in dates, suggesting positive externalities from the imposition of mandatory 
disclosures on other firms.  Newly Compliant firms exhibit significantly lower returns than 
Already Compliant firms at the key announcement dates.  This result is consistent with our 
argument that the eligibility rule forces Newly Compliant firms to adopt their second-best   4
alternative, as they can no longer trade on the OTCBB without filing with the SEC.  
Noncompliant firms exhibit even lower returns around the key announcement dates.  Moreover, 
they experience significantly negative abnormal returns upon removal from the OTCBB.  These 
findings indicate that the imposition of disclosure requirements has significant costs for those 
firms forced into a less regulated and less automated market.
2 
Finally, we examine changes in firms’ market liquidity around the phase-in of the eligibility 
rule.  This analysis corroborates the results for firms’ compliance responses and stock returns 
and aids their interpretation.  We find that Newly Compliant firms experience significant 
increases in liquidity, which are significantly larger than for all other firms.  However, the 
liquidity benefits do not imply that imposing SEC disclosures made these firms better off; the 
announcement returns and the non-disclosure strategy prior to the eligibility rule suggest the 
opposite.  Noncompliant firms experience significant and sustained decreases in all liquidity 
measures after their removal from the OTCBB, consistent with the return results.  Already 
Compliant firms exhibit significant and sustained increases in liquidity for two of three 
measures.  This finding is also consistent with the return results and suggests liquidity spillovers 
and improved market reputation as possible sources of externalities. 
This paper contributes to a fairly limited empirical literature on the economic consequences 
of disclosure regulation.
3  According to Healy and Palepu (2001, p. 415), empirical research on 
disclosure regulation is “virtually non-existent.”  Notable exceptions are the early studies by 
                                                 
2   The Pinks Sheets did not offer a web portal with electronic quotes until mid-2000, suggesting lower liquidity 
and price transparency than the OTCBB. Our evidence of liquidity changes around the move from the OTCBB 
to the Pink Sheets is consistent with this interpretation. 
3  There is, however, a vast literature on the economic consequences of mandated changes in accounting 
standards (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Fields, Lys, and Vincent, 2001).  This literature, along with capital-
markets research in accounting, generally focuses on the relation between reported accounting numbers and 
stock returns (or prices), thereby providing evidence on whether the required numbers add value to investors 
(see also Kothari, 2001).  However, these studies occur within the already-rich SEC disclosure environment, 
whereas our study analyzes the imposition of SEC disclosure requirements.   5
Stigler (1964) and Benston (1969 and 1973), investigating the benefits of the Securities Acts and 
concluding that the statutes were of no apparent value to investors.  These studies have been 
heavily debated and challenged (see Coffee, 1984, for a survey).  We examine a recent expansion 
of disclosure regulation and show that the imposition of SEC disclosure requirements results in 
significant costs and benefits to firms.  Moreover, we provide some evidence on the existence of 
externalities, which are commonly viewed as a justification for regulation. 
Our paper also contributes to the understanding of the OTC Bulletin Board, a market that 
has been largely ignored by prior research.
4  The only paper to examine this market as a whole is 
Luft et al. (2000).  They find that, prior to the eligibility rule, OTCBB securities yield lower 
returns with higher risk than securities listed on major exchanges.  They attribute these results to 
the lack of information and liquidity in the OTCBB.  Our paper provides evidence on the 
liquidity of this market and how it changes around the introduction of disclosure requirements. 
The next section reviews prior work on the economics of disclosure regulation and explains 
how the OTCBB setting can be exploited to contribute to this literature.  Section 3 develops our 
hypotheses.  In Section 4, we explain the construction of the key samples and examine firms’ 
listing responses to the eligibility rule.  Section 5 discusses the results for firms’ stock returns.  
Section 6 reports the findings for changes in liquidity measures. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2.  The Economics of Disclosure Regulation and the Institutional Setting 
2.1  Theory and evidence 
Why should firms be mandated to disclose information?  Firms have incentives to provide 
information voluntarily because they ultimately bear the cost of withholding it.  In the absence of 
                                                 
4   Studies on cross listings in the US sometimes include foreign firms trading on the OTCBB (e.g., Botosan and 
Frost, 1998).   6
frictions, full disclosure prevails without regulation (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1980).  If 
disclosure is costly, firms may withhold some information (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983).  But even in 
this case, the optimal disclosure level can be achieved without regulation; firms simply trade off 
the costs and benefits of disclosure. Thus, the role of mandatory disclosure is far from obvious. 
One potential role of mandatory disclosure is to serve as a commitment device.  Disclosures 
reduce the firm’s cost of capital, but only if they are credible and not self-serving.  The problem 
is that firms have incentives to withhold or manipulate information in certain situations (e.g., 
poor performance).  Thus, to effectively reduce the cost of capital, firms have to commit to 
disclose information in a truthful and non-selective manner (e.g., Verrecchia, 2001).  Mandatory 
disclosures bind firms to reveal information regardless of its realization, provided that they are 
properly enforced.  Such requirements can be provided privately, for instance, by an exchange in 
the form of a listing agreement, or publicly by a regulatory act.
5  As our setting involves private 
regulation endorsed by a public regulator, we cannot distinguish between the two alternatives 
and use the term ‘disclosure regulation’ for both of them.
6 
Externalities provide a second rationale for mandatory disclosure regimes.  They arise 
whenever the social and private values of information or disclosure differ.  In such a case, firms 
trading off the private costs and benefits do not provide the socially optimal level of disclosure.  
Thus, mandating firms to provide certain information can be desirable. 
Prior work provides several hypotheses on the existence of externalities.  Hirshleifer (1971) 
argues that private information acquisition for speculative gains in securities markets is socially 
                                                 
5    The key point is that firms voluntarily seek such commitment devices. Huddart et al. (1999) show that 
exchanges competing for liquidity have incentives to set tough disclosure standards and generally do not 
engage in a ‘race to the bottom’. 
6   Glaeser et al. (2001) argue that the two alternatives differ mainly in their enforcement mechanism. Exchange 
rules are enforced by private litigation in courts whereas securities regulation is enforced by a regulatory 
agency. They provide evidence that private and public enforcement can yield different outcomes.   7
wasteful.  Disclosure can preempt these activities and mitigate the overproduction of 
information.  On the other hand, private monitoring creates free-rider problems by conferring 
uncompensated benefits on other investors. The resulting underproduction of monitoring can also 
be mitigated by disclosure, as it reduces the costs of information acquisition (e.g., Coffee, 1984). 
Dye (1990) and Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) argue that firms’ disclosures have positive 
externalities in the form of information transfers and liquidity spillovers.  With correlated firm 
values or cash flows, information disclosed by one firm can be useful in valuing other firms and 
increase investors’ willingness to hold positions in other firms.  But disclosures can also have 
negative externalities if investors (or analysts) follow only a limited number of firms, e.g., due to 
information processing costs.  Fishman and Hagerty (1989) argue that, in this case, increases in 
disclosure can attract investors away from other firms, resulting in lower price efficiency in 
imperfectly competitive markets. 
The preceding discussion suggests that the effects of disclosure regulation are complex. 
They are further complicated by the fact that firms have various ways to respond to disclosure 
regulation.  For instance, firms can choose to trade in a different market, go private, or not go 
public.  For these reasons, empirical studies of firms’ responses and market reactions to 
disclosure regulation provide valuable input into regulatory decisions.  Early studies by Stigler 
(1964) and Benston (1969 and 1973) empirically investigate the benefits of the 1933 and 1934 
Acts and conclude that the statutes were of no apparent value to investors.  These findings have 
been repeatedly challenged (e.g., Friend and Herman, 1964; Seligman, 1983).  Coffee (1984) 
reviews the (inconclusive) debate and argues that the focus should be shifted to contemporary 
securities regulation as much has changed since the 1930s.   8
To address this void, our study exploits a recent regulatory act in the over-the-counter 
markets that affected more than 3,500 firms.  As the next section shows, our setting provides an 
opportunity to study the aforementioned key aspects of disclosure regulation: market reactions, 
firms’ responses, and externalities. 
2.2  The Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board Market 
The OTC Bulletin Board (OTCBB) is an electronic quotation medium for small-cap 
securities not traded on NASDAQ or listed on one of the national exchanges.  The OTCBB is 
operated and regulated by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and it provides 
real-time quotes, last-sales prices, and volume information.  It was established in June 1990, 
partially in response to the Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990.  This Act mandated the creation of 
an electronic system to provide widespread quotation and trade information, thereby increasing 
price transparency in the OTC market.  By 1998, more than 6,000 domestic issues were quoted 
on the OTCBB with an average daily trading volume over $200 million and an estimated market 
capitalization of over $50 billion.  Thus, the OTCBB represents a sizeable segment of the U.S. 
securities market. 
In contrast to the NASDAQ market, there are no listing requirements or quotation fees on 
the OTCBB.  Firms can simply approach a market maker for sponsorship.  Market makers are 
prohibited from accepting any remuneration for their quotation services from the issuers.  The 
OTCBB is also distinct from the Pink Sheets, another over-the-counter market segment, which 
until recently did not provide electronic quotations.  The Appendix provides a summary 
comparison of the market characteristics, disclosure requirements, and enforcement rules of 
these three markets.   9
Before 1999, issuers in the OTC markets did not have to file periodic financial reports with 
the SEC if they (1) had never registered securities under the 1933 Act and (2) were below the 
thresholds specified in Section 12(g) of the 1934 Act.  Firms with security offerings registered 
under the 1933 Act are mandated by Section 15(d) to comply with the periodic reporting 
obligations of the 1934 Act.
7  Section 12(g) stipulates that issuers with total assets exceeding $10 
million and a class of security held by more than 500 persons on the last day of the fiscal year 
must register their securities under the 1934 Act.  
Exemptions from registration under the 1933 Act, as well as size and ownership limits in 
Section 12(g), implied that over half of the companies quoted on the OTCBB in 1998 were not 
subject to SEC reporting requirements.
8  For these firms, the only reporting requirements 
stemmed from SEC Rule 15c2-11. This rule mandates that any broker/dealer initiating a 
quotation obtain current financial reports (e.g., balance sheet and income statement) from the 
issuer.  After 30 days, the stock becomes eligible for the “piggyback” exemption, which allows 
other market makers (including the initiating market maker) to issue quotes without having 
updated financial information.  For this reason, financial reports were generally not publicly 
available for those firms not required to file with the SEC (WSJ, 12/9/1997).
9  Moreover, Rule 
15c2-11 does not require financial reports to be audited and demands far fewer disclosures than 
SEC Form 10-K. 
                                                 
7   Firms can use various exemptions to avoid registration under the 1933 Act.  For instance, rule 504 of 
Regulation D allows issuers to sell up to $1 million of stock without registration under the 1933 Act. 
8   See, e.g., WSJ, 1/7/1999 and SEC Adopting Release 34-40878. Note that the size and ownership criteria only 
apply at the last day of the fiscal year. Thus, exceeding the limits during the fiscal year is irrelevant, which may 
allow issuers to circumvent registration. See Loss and Seligman (2001, p. 444-446). 
9    We confirmed this claim in interviews with officials from NASDAQ, the SEC and several OTC market 
makers. Note further that any availability of information prior to the eligibility rule biases our results against 
finding significant reactions and changes.   10
In the late 1990’s, the SEC and the NASD jointly considered improving the disclosure of 
financial information by OTCBB firms.  There was a resurgence of OTC securities fraud and the 
relatively unregulated OTCBB was perceived as exacerbating the problem (WSJ, 9/4/1997).
10  In 
addition, the NASD was concerned that investors could confuse the OTCBB with its more highly 
regulated NASDAQ market and that real-time quotations gave unwary investors a false sense of 
reliability, particularly considering the lack of disclosure requirements (WSJ, 12/9/1997).  In 
February 1998, the NASD Board of Governors proposed to restrict quotations on the OTCBB to 
those domestic companies that report current financial information to the SEC, banking, or 
insurance regulators.  After public comment, the so-called “eligibility rule” was approved by the 
NASD in May 1998 and submitted to the SEC for approval. 
On January 4, 1999, the SEC approved the eligibility rule as amendments to NASD rules 
6530 and 6540.  It limits quotations on the OTCBB to securities of issuers that make current 
filings pursuant to Sections 13 and 15(d) of the 1934 Act, and securities of depositary institutions 
and insurance companies that make filings under the Act, but with the appropriate regulatory 
agencies.  The eligibility rule implies that OTCBB companies have to file annual reports using 
Form 10-K as well as quarterly and current reports using Form 10-Q and 8-K, respectively.  
Moreover, the filings are made easily accessible through the SEC’s EDGAR database.  Thus, the 
eligibility rule considerably increases mandatory disclosures for firms that were previously not 
filing with the SEC.  In addition, it creates civil liabilities under Section 18 and brings firms’ 
reporting under the auspices of the SEC enforcement (e.g., Section 15(c)(4) compliance orders).  
                                                 
10  State regulators estimate that investor losses due to penny stock abuses amounted to $6 billion annually during 
the 1990’s (WSJ, 9/22/1997). Anecdotal evidence also suggests that there is a significant number of small retail 
investors trading in the OTC markets.   11
Thus, the eligibility rule substantially increases private and public enforcement of disclosures 
(see also Appendix). 
The eligibility rule became immediately effective for new OTCBB quotations, but provided 
a phase-in period for issuers with securities quoted as of January 4, 1999.  Each issuer was 
assigned a phase-in date between July 1999 and June 2000 based on its ticker symbol as of 
January 4, 1999.  Thus, the implementation schedule gave companies between 6 and 18 months 
after the rule’s approval to become current in their filing with the SEC.  Between 100 and 300 
firms were tested for compliance at each phase-in date, and all but the first three months had two 
phase-in dates.  Filing status was reviewed in an initial compliance test 30 days prior to the 
phase-in date (60 days prior for banks and insurance companies).  If the NASD did not have 
information establishing that the issuer was current in its filings with the SEC, it appended an 
“E” as fifth character to the ticker symbol to flag non-compliance with the eligibility rule.  If the 
company subsequently became compliant with the eligibility rule, the “E” was eliminated; 
otherwise, the issuer was removed from the OTCBB on the day after the phase-in date. 
3.  Hypothesis Development and Research Design 
As explained in the previous section, the eligibility rule mandates a substantial increase in 
the amount and enforcement of required disclosures for many OTCBB firms.  The rule 
eliminates the possibility to trade on the OTCBB without making the required disclosures, 
forcing firms to either comply with SEC disclosure requirements or to leave the OTCBB.  In 
responding to the rule, firms are expected to tradeoff the costs and benefits of mandatory 
disclosures, SEC scrutiny and enforcement, and extended legal liability.  Thus, firms’ 
compliance responses likely reflect these tradeoffs.  Similarly, returns around the rule’s 
announcement and implementation provide evidence on the net costs or benefits to OTCBB   12
firms.  An analysis of market liquidity provides evidence on the sources of those costs and 
benefits and, hence, aids our interpretations of the compliance and return results. 
We begin by considering how different groups of firms are affected by the eligibility rule.  
Some firms were already filing with the SEC and, hence, were not directly affected by the 
eligibility rule.  We call them Already Compliant firms.  This group should only be affected if 
disclosure regulation results in externalities.  Among the firms that previously did not file with 
the SEC, there are likely to be firms for which compliance is too costly.  These firms are 
expected to be removed from the OTCBB and to trade in the Pink Sheets (henceforth, 
Noncompliant firms).  Finally, there may be firms that adopt SEC disclosures for the first time.  
These Newly Compliant firms could have voluntarily filed with the SEC before the rule change, 
if it had been beneficial to them.  Thus, the fact that these firms previously did not file with the 
SEC suggests that even for these firms the costs of SEC disclosures exceed the benefits.  Trading 
in the OTCBB with SEC disclosures is likely to be their next-best alternative and preferred to 
trading in the Pink Sheets without such disclosures, which is what compels these firms to expand 
their disclosure.
11  Thus, we expect three main groups of firms to emerge in response to the 
eligibility rule.
12 
Next, we develop predictions how firms’ compliance responses relate to firm characteristics. 
The disclosure literature suggests firm size, ownership structure, financing needs, firm 
profitability, and industry membership as key determinants of (voluntary) corporate disclosures 
                                                 
11   Such a preference ranking likely exists for the marginal firms that are “sitting on the fence” with respect to 
voluntarily adopting SEC disclosures and likely arises for some firms if the imposition of disclosure 
requirements confers positive externalities on all firms in the OTCBB market. 
12  Firms could also go private or “list up” to the NASDAQ or AMEX. We find that such responses are rare. 
Fewer than 30 went private or listed up between introduction of the eligibility rule and 60 days after firms’ 
compliance date.  These groups are small presumably because there is a market below the OTCBB (i.e., the 
Pink Sheets) and because the markets above the OTCBB have additional listing requirements.    13
(e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1993 and 2000; Healy and Palepu, 2001).  We expect that these 
factors also determine whether OTCBB firms perceive the required SEC disclosures as having 
net benefits or costs and, hence, should explain firms’ compliance responses to the eligibility 
rule.  Specifically, we expect Noncompliant firms, which are forced to trade in the Pink Sheets, 
to be smaller, have more concentrated ownership, lower financing needs, and higher profitability 
than Newly Compliant firms, which continue to trade in the OTCBB.
13 
Next, we turn to our predictions for the stock return tests.  Assuming that the market 
anticipates the economic consequences of the eligibility rule, as well as firms’ responses, returns 
around the key news announcements of the rule provide an initial measure of the net costs and 
benefits to firms.  Returns around the implementation dates provide updated measures at a time 
when the residual uncertainty about firms’ compliance is resolved. 
Already Compliant firms should not exhibit abnormal returns in the absence of externalities.  
Thus, positive or negative returns likely reflect externalities from the imposition of SEC 
disclosure regulation on previously unregulated firms.  We expect Noncompliant firms to be 
adversely affected by the eligibility rule.  Even though noncompliance is their preferred 
disclosure strategy, these firms are forced into the Pink Sheets, which at the time did not offer 
electronic quotations and generally had a lower reputation (see also Appendix).  Newly 
Compliant firms are also forced to adopt their second-best alternative, as their disclosure strategy 
prior to the rule suggests that they preferred to trade in the OTCBB without SEC disclosures.  
Thus, we expect these firms to be negatively affected as well.  For both groups of firms, positive 
externalities of disclosure requirements such as informational spillovers would counteract the 
                                                 
13  Note that the relation with profitability is less apparent because corporate governance benefits of disclosure 
and the existence of larger private control benefits for non-disclosing firms suggest the opposite sign.   14
negative reaction.  But as both groups are forced into their second-best alternative, they are 
expected to exhibit lower returns than the Already Compliant firms. 
Finally, we form predictions for the market liquidity tests.  As Noncompliant firms are 
forced into a market without electronic quotations, they are expected to exhibit lower liquidity.  
Newly Compliant firms substantially increase their disclosures.  Prior literature suggests that 
increased disclosure reduces information asymmetries and increases market liquidity (Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2000; Healy and Palepu, 2001).  Thus, we expect Newly Compliant firms to 
experience significant increases in liquidity.  Market liquidity for Already Compliant firms 
should be unchanged, unless externalities manifest in positive liquidity changes.  For instance, an 
enhanced OTCBB reputation can increase investors’ willingness to trade.  Similarly, increased 
disclosure by Newly Compliant firms can curb private information acquisition for all firms in the 
market and, hence, result in liquidity spillovers.  Alternatively, firms increasing their disclosure 
could attract investors away from Already Compliant firms not changing their disclosure, 
resulting in a negative externality.  Whether externalities are positive or negative is ultimately an 
empirical issue.  However, irrespective of the sign and magnitude of the externalities, we expect 
Newly Compliant firms to exhibit the most favorable change in liquidity due to their increased 
commitment to disclosure.  Noncompliant firms should exhibit the least favorable change 
because they move to a less liquid market.  Already Compliant firms should be located between 
the two groups as they are only affected by any externalities. 
4.  Evidence on firms’ compliance responses 
4.1  Listing statistics and key compliance samples 
We collect data on firms quoted on the OTCBB from its website (www.otcbb.com).  As of 
January 4, 1999, there were 6,513 securities quoted on the OTCBB.  These securities included   15
warrants, units, preferred stock, and foreign securities.  Because the eligibility rule applied only 
to primary domestic issues, these securities were dropped from the sample, leaving a sample of 
6,096 domestic common stock issues.  Of this list, 483 were found to be inactive and removed by 
the OTCBB prior to the phase-in of the eligibility rule.  This left a sample of 5,613 firms listed 
on the OTCBB that were subject to the eligibility rule phase-in schedule (see Table 1). 
The OTCBB website has an archive of daily lists of additions, deletions, changes in names 
and/or tickers, and revisions to prior daily lists dating back to March 1998.  Accompanying the 
deletions are the reasons for the delisting, the new exchange the security will trade on (if 
applicable), and a new ticker.  We use these daily lists to obtain dates and reasons for all changes 
in status of our original sample firms.  The daily lists also include new additions to the market.  
All of these firms were subject to the eligibility rule upon listing. 
Table 1 presents the number of sample firms still trading on the OTCBB as of June 2001 and 
the delisting reasons for those firms that exited the OTCBB.  Of the 5,613 firms in the January 4, 
1999 sample, only 1,920 (34%) are still trading on the OTCBB.  The majority of firms (59%) 
were delisted for noncompliance either with the eligibility rule (3,190 during phase-in, 399 after) 
or with Rule 15c, which requires that firms have an active market maker (99 firms).  Upon 
delisting, most of these firms moved to the Pink Sheets of the National Quotations Bureau.  In 
fact, the Pink Sheets doubled its number of quoted securities from around 3,000 to more than 
6,000 due to the delistings from the OTCBB.
14  Of the firms that moved down to the Pink Sheets, 
361 firms subsequently complied with the eligibility rule and rejoined the OTCBB.  The 
                                                 
14  See, e.g., Smartmoney.com, “Skid Row for Stocks”, Dow Jones Newswire, 10/13/1999.  In response to the 
large number of delistings from the Bulletin Board, the National Quotations Bureau created an electronic 
quotation service for their Pink Sheets.  A web portal was launched in June 2000, from which investors can 
obtain quotes with a 15-minute delay (www.pinksheets.com).   16
remainder of the firms leaving the OTCBB moved either to the NASDAQ, AMEX or NYSE 
(190; 3%), were acquired, liquidated, or taken private. 
Table 2, Panel A, reports statistics for the phase-in of the eligibility rule.  It shows that 33% 
of the 5,613 issuers reviewed (1,814 firms) passed the initial compliance test.  The remaining 
67% failed the initial test and had an “E” added to the end of their ticker symbol.  Between the 
initial compliance test and the phase-in date, 609 initial-fail firms became compliant, had the “E” 
removed from their ticker symbol, and continued to trade on the OTCBB.  The remaining 3,190 
firms (57%) were removed from the OTCBB one day after the phase-in date due to 
noncompliance with the eligibility rule. 
Table 2, Panel B, identifies the key subsamples used in our primary tests.  Newly Compliant 
firms (946) include all non-SEC-filers in 1998 that adopted SEC disclosure requirements because 
of the eligibility rule.  This group consists of firms that adopted SEC filing prior to the phase-in 
period (435 firms), firms that failed the initial compliance test but became compliant prior to the 
phase-in date (404 firms), and firms that failed to comply prior to the phase-in date, but filed 
with the SEC within the next two months and hence were reinstated to the OTCBB (107 firms).  
We view these firms as late adopters.  Noncompliant firms (2,682) are all non-SEC-filers in 1998 
that were removed from the OTCBB and subsequently did not adopt SEC disclosures.
15  Already 
Compliant firms (1,379 firms) are issuers that were already filing with the SEC in 1998 and 
passed the initial compliance test.  Finally, firms filing with the SEC in 1998 that did not initially 
pass the compliance test are either Delinquent firms, which became current in their filings only 
after failing the initial compliance test, or Terminated filing firms, which stopped filing with the 
                                                 
15   There were almost 200 firms in this group that adopted SEC filing at some point beyond the two-month cut-off 
and rejoined the OTCBB.  Because of the length of time that elapsed after the phase-in date, these firms likely 
adopted SEC filing for reasons other than the eligibility rule.  Note that including these firms in this subsample 
works against our hypotheses.   17
SEC at some point in 1999 and were removed as noncompliant.  We delete these firms from our 
test because they are likely firms in financial distress and they do not fit well in any of the other 
groups.
16  
Notably, Panel B of shows that only 26% of the 3,628 non-SEC-filers in 1998 complied with 
the eligibility rule and remained on the OTCBB, whereas 74% of these firms moved to the Pink 
Sheets.  These findings are consistent with our expectations.  For the majority of firms, the costs 
of SEC disclosures appear to exceed the benefits, before and after the eligibility rule.   
Finally, we use NASDAQ Small Cap firms as a benchmark sample (627 firms).  Comparing 
Already Compliant OTCBB firms to NASDAQ Small Cap firms allows us to control for time 
trends and economy-wide changes in our externality tests.  Both groups of firms have the same 
SEC filing requirements and are relatively comparable in firm size.  At the end of 1998, the 
average (median) market capitalization of NASDAQ Small Cap firms was $21.5 (10.9) million 
compared to $8.0 (8.5) million for Already Compliant OTCBB firms. 
4.2  Compliance and firm characteristics 
In this section, we examine firm characteristics for SEC filers and non-SEC-filers in 1998 
and for Newly Compliant and Noncompliant firms. We use the firm’s share price, market value 
of equity, and book value of total assets as alternative measures of firm size.
17  The number of 
shareholders is used as proxy for the firm’s ownership structure.  Alternative measures, such as 
                                                 
16    The results for the Delinquent filers tend to mirror those of the Newly Compliant firms and results for 
Terminated filers are similar to those of Noncompliant firms.  
17   We have discovered that early in the Datastream data series market values are often incorrect because the 
series begin with an incorrect number of total shares outstanding.  To mitigate this error, we compute shares 
outstanding as of the last day the firm is listed on Datastream and multiply this figure by the price on a given 
date to get the market value.  As price series are split-adjusted, this adjustment should provide a reasonable 
approximation of market value for any given date.  Results are very similar using the unadjusted market values, 
but the levels of the market values were much lower.   18
the percentage of closely-held shares, are only available for a few sample firms.  We compute the 
ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total assets as a measure of capital intensity.  Financial 
leverage is measured as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets.  Both capital intensity and 
financial leverage are meant to capture outside financing needs. Return on assets is used as a 
proxy for firm profitability and measured as net income over total assets.  As we do not have 
lagged total assets, this variable may suffer from small-denominator problems.  Therefore, we 
also determine the fraction of profitable firms; i.e., firms with positive net income.  In addition, 
we report the percentage of banks and insurance companies in each group, as they are in 
regulated industries and have to provide financial information to their regulatory agencies.  
We obtain financial statement and ownership data from the Global Access SEC database, 
Mergent’s FIS Online database (previously owned by Moody’s Investor Service), and Knobias, 
an information repository for OTC security research launched in 1999.  The databases rely on 
firms’ financial reports, either obtained directly from the firms or from their SEC filings. Of the 
5,613 firms in our sample, we have some financial data for 1,991 firms from Global Access, 
1,360 firms from Mergent, and 524 firms from Knobias.  In addition, we hand collect data from 
SEC filings for 1,003 firms with missing observations. We combine the datasets to increase data 
availability and we delete 1% of the extreme observations on either side of the distribution 
(except for naturally-bounded variables). All financial and ownership data is measured as of the 
fiscal year end between July 1, 1998 and June 30, 1999, and hence prior to the phase-in of the 
eligibility rule.
18 
                                                 
18  For a small number of firms, we have to use financial data (3%) and number of shareholders (14%) from the 
previous fiscal year end because data for the fiscal year end between July 1, 1998 and June 30, 1999 is missing.   19
Table 3 presents means and medians for various firm characteristics of SEC filers, non-SEC-
filers, Newly Compliant firms and Noncompliant firms.  As expected, data availability is an 
issue for non-SEC-filers, particularly for Noncompliant firms.  This problem implies that our 
results likely understate the differences in firm characteristics if the hypothesized factors drive 
firms’ compliance choices.  That is, we are less likely to obtain data for firms that are smaller, 
have more concentrated ownership, low financing needs, and high profitability.  For these 
reasons, our tests should be interpreted cautiously and be viewed primarily as an attempt to 
provide some descriptive evidence for the groups used in the subsequent analyses. 
Table 3, Panel A, shows that SEC filers are significantly larger, more capital intensive, more 
highly leveraged and more profitable than non-SEC-filers.  They also have more shareholders, 
which is not surprising given that Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act requires firms to file with 
the SEC if they have more than 500 shareholders.
19  Table 3, Panel A, also reports significant 
differences among Newly Compliant and Noncompliant firms.  The former group exhibits higher 
market values, lower capital intensity and lower profitability.  In addition, banks and insurance 
companies become compliant and remain on the OTCBB more frequently. 
We analyze firms’ compliance choices in probit models.  The results are reported in Panel B 
of Table 3.  To control for industry and timing effects, we include a bank and insurance indicator 
as well as a variable for the number of months from the approval of the eligibility rule on 
1/4/1999 to the firm’s phase-in date.  We begin with share price as a size proxy because this 
variable is available for the majority of firms.  Next, we use market value as size proxy, which is 
                                                 
19   The fact that 50% of the SEC filers have fewer than 500 shareholders as reported in Table 3 has several 
reasons. First, Section 12(g) has different entry and exit criteria. To discontinue filing, firms must either have 
fewer than 300 shareholders or fewer than 500 shareholders and less than $10 million in total assets for 3 
consecutive years. Second, Section 15(d) mandates periodic SEC filing (1) in the year after the security 
offering regardless of the number of owners and (2) for three years after the offering if the firm has more than 
300, but fewer than 500 owners. Firms may also voluntarily file with the SEC. See Loss and Seligman (2001).   20
clearly preferable but available for fewer firms.  Both proxies are positively associated with the 
decision to continue on the OTCBB.  Subsequently, we introduce proxies for financial leverage 
and profitability, which further reduces sample size.  Both variables are only marginally 
significant, but suggest that firms, which are able to raise long-term debt, and are less profitable 
firms are more likely to comply with the eligibility rule.
20  While these findings are broadly 
consistent with our expectations, suggesting that compliance choices reflect firms’ costs and 
benefits of disclosure regulation, they have to be interpreted cautiously due to the sample 
selection issue.  The next two sections examine the economic consequences of the eligibility rule 
using market metrics, i.e., liquidity measures and stock returns, which are more readily available. 
5.  Stock return tests 
5.1  Data and variables 
We obtain our return data from two sources.  We collect daily price, dividend, shares 
outstanding, and share volume data from Thomson Financial Datastream, which follows most of 
the firms on the OTCBB and, more recently, many Pink Sheet firms.  However, Datastream 
stopped following many of the Noncompliant firms in the months following their removal from 
the OTCBB and did not cover them again until December 2000.  We augment the Datastream 
dataset using daily volume and price data provided by the Pink Sheets.  We split-adjust the Pink 
Sheet price and volume series using overlapping Datastream prices after December 2000.  In the 
final dataset, we have some return data for 5,173 sample firms.   
                                                 
20    Using capital intensity instead of financial leverage as proxy for financing needs yields a positive, but 
insignificant coefficient.  We use the profitability indicator rather than return on assets, as the former is more 
often available and not affected by scaling problems. Using return on assets yields similar results, though less 
significant results. Using ranked right-hand side variables instead of deleting extreme observations yields 
significant probit results similar to those reported in Table 3 (for either profitability variable).   21
We use daily price and dividend data to compute monthly and weekly buy-and-hold returns.  
Because of the lack of an OTCBB market index, we construct a market index from all OTCBB 
firms for which we have data.  Similar to Luft et al. (2000), we construct an equally-weighted 
index, rather than a value-weighted index, because of the difficulty in obtaining total shares 
outstanding, and hence market values, for OTCBB firms.
21  We also obtain daily return data 
from Datastream for NASDAQ Small Cap firms, which we use as a benchmark to assess returns 
of the OTCBB as a whole and those of Already Compliant firms in particular. 
5.2  Results for returns around dates of news announcements pertaining to the eligibility rule 
First, we examine weekly returns around key news announcements pertaining to the 
proposal and approval of the eligibility rule.  These news announcement returns provide a 
measure of the market’s initial assessment of the net costs and benefits for firms and for the 
market as a whole.  We examine five key event dates.  On September 4, 1997, the Wall Street 
Journal published an article detailing instances of fraud on the OTCBB, attributing part of the 
problem to lack of SEC disclosure requirements, and hinting at changes (WSJ, 9/4/1997).  On 
December 9, 1997, the NASD Board of Governors announced that SEC filing may be required 
for the OTCBB and that as many as 3,400 firms could be removed (WSJ, 12/9/1997).  On 
February 13, 1998, the NASD Board of Governors proposed several rule changes and approved 
the solicitation of comment.  After the comment period and internal discussions, the NASD 
Board approved the proposed rule change on May 7, 1998.  The SEC finally announced its 
approval of the eligibility rule on January 4, 1999. 
                                                 
21   The distribution of daily returns reveals a small number of returns greater than 500% (less than 0.001% of the 
distribution).  An investigation of some of these returns suggests that they are likely coding errors on the part 
of the database.  To be conservative, we delete all daily returns over 500%.  In addition, because an equally 
weighted index is susceptible to outliers, we winsorize the return data at the 99
th percentile prior to 
constructing the index.   22
Columns three and four of Table 4 present weekly returns for NASDAQ Small Cap firms 
and the OTCBB market as a whole on these news announcement dates.  Returns are compounded 
from three days before the news announcement to one day after.  The sample is restricted to 
firms with data for all five event periods.  Except on the first event date, the returns for OTCBB 
firms are similar and not statistically different from contemporaneous returns of NASDAQ Small 
Cap firms.  The mean cumulative return over all event dates is also similar for both markets.
22 
The next two columns of Table 4 report weekly raw returns for firms filing with the SEC 
during 1998 and for firms not yet filing with the SEC.  SEC filing status is observable to the 
market and could serve as a signal for how firms will be affected by the proposed eligibility 
rule.
23  While SEC filers should be unaffected by the proposed rule change, their returns are not 
expected to be zero if the market expects externalities from the imposition of disclosure 
regulation.  Non-SEC-filers include firms that will ultimately adopt SEC disclosure requirements 
and firms that will not.  The returns for this group are therefore difficult to interpret as they 
depend also on the expected fraction of Newly Compliant and Noncompliant firms.  We find that 
SEC filers have significantly greater returns than non-SEC-filers on four of the five event dates 
and cumulatively, suggesting that the market recognizes that a large number of firms in the non-
SEC-filer group are adversely affected by the eligibility rule.  The cumulative returns of the SEC 
filers are significantly greater than those of the NASDAQ Small Cap firms, consistent with the 
market anticipating significant externalities for these firms. 
                                                 
22   One issue with this comparison is that the industry composition of the tech-heavy NASDAQ Small Cap differs 
from the broad industry composition of the OTCBB.  Thus, we also collect returns for the Russell 2000.  This 
index is comprised of 2000 small-cap, non-OTCBB firms and hence provides a broader proxy for the market 
return unrelated to the eligibility rule. Its cumulative return is similar (6.1%). 
23   We include Delinquent and Terminated filing firms in the SEC filer group because the market may not have 
known at this point whether these firms would stop filing with the SEC prior to the eligibility rule.   23
The last three columns of Table 4 report weekly returns for Noncompliant, Newly 
Compliant, and Already Compliant firms.  The market does not know these groups at the time of 
the news announcements, so the returns to these groups provide a measure of whether the market 
anticipates firms’ ultimate compliance choices.  Already Compliant firms exhibit the highest 
returns among all three groups, consistent with positive externalities from disclosure regulation.  
The cumulative returns to this group are also significantly greater than the returns of Small Cap 
firms.  The cumulative returns of the Newly Compliant firms are significantly less than those for 
Already Compliant firms.  This finding reflects the fact that the eligibility rule eliminated the 
possibility to trade on the OTCBB without significantly increasing disclosures, forcing these 
firms to their second-best option.  The cumulative returns for Newly Compliant firms are 2.3% 
higher than those of Noncompliant firms, but the difference is not statistically significant.  Thus, 
there is some evidence that the market anticipates different net costs and benefits across the two 
groups of firms.
24  However, significant uncertainty about firms’ future compliance choices 
could attenuate the market response at the news announcement dates.   
5.3  Results for returns around the phase-in date 
Next, we examine market-adjusted returns for months and weeks surrounding the phase-in 
date to examine stock price changes in response to firms’ anticipated and actual compliance 
choices.  Market-adjusted returns are computed as buy-and-hold firm returns minus buy-and-
hold returns from the equally-weighted index of all OTCBB firms.
25  Table 5 presents market-
                                                 
24   This pattern is not consistent with a size effect as Noncompliant and Newly Compliant firms tend to be smaller 
than Already Compliant firms.  Nevertheless, we estimate these results in a regression controlling for firm size.  
Returns to Already Compliant firms remain significantly greater than returns to Newly Compliant and 
Noncompliant firms. 
25   Because phase-in dates are spread out over 12 months, less than 10% of the market index in any given event 
month is comprised of firms that are phased-in during this month.  The remainder of the index includes firms   24
adjusted returns for the Already Compliant firms, Newly Compliant firms, and Noncompliant 
firms from four months prior to the phase-in date to three months after.  To tie the returns 
directly to the key phase-in dates, we look at weekly market-adjusted returns within the month of 
the phase-in date and monthly returns outside this window.  With the firm-specific phase-in date 
defined as event date zero, weekly returns for the phase-in date are computed from day –3 to day 
+1 (see Figure 1a).  During days –23 to –19, which we label as the “Announcement” week, the 
OTCBB posts on its website which firms have not passed the initial compliance test.  During 
days –18 to –14, the “Effective ‘E’” week, firms that have failed the initial compliance tests start 
trading with an “E” appended to their ticker symbol.  This sequence of events applies only to 
nonfinancial firms.  For banks and insurance companies, the initial compliance test is 60 calendar 
days, rather than 30, prior to the phase-in date.  We therefore eliminate financial firms from these 
tests.
26 
For Already Compliant firms, there are significantly positive abnormal returns in the 
Effective “E” week and the following week, as well as the week after the phase-in week.  The 
returns could reflect positive externalities, although it is less clear why these externalities arise 
around the phase-in date of the Already Compliant firms.  Alternatively, these abnormal returns 
could reflect the resolution of some residual uncertainty about the compliance of Already 
Compliant firms.
27   
Noncompliant firms experience significantly negative abnormal returns in the month before 
the announcement week and for almost every period after the Effective “E” week.  Thus, most of 
                                                                                                                                                             
that had earlier or later phase-in dates and firms that were added to the OTCBB after January 4, 1999 (and 
hence had to comply with the eligibility rule immediately).  Thus, it is unlikely that any group of firms in event 
time drives the market index as a whole. 
26   We repeated these tests including banks and insurance companies and found similar results. 
27   However, in section 6.4, we split Already Compliant firms into mandatory and voluntary filers and find that 
the positive returns stem also from the mandatory firms, for which there is no uncertainty.   25
the negative returns associated with noncompliance occur only after these firms fail the initial 
compliance test.  This finding suggests that the market did not completely anticipate the firm’s 
intention to comply until the initial compliance test.  From the Effective “E” week to three 
months after the phase-in date, Noncompliant firms have market-adjusted returns of around -
25%.
28  This finding suggests that there are significant net costs to Noncompliant firms related to 
their removal from the OTCBB and the introduction of the eligibility rule.
29 
The results for Newly Compliant firms are difficult to interpret because the group combines 
firms that passed the initial compliance test with firms that initially failed, and it includes firms 
that were temporarily removed due to delayed compliance.  Thus, we further split this group into 
three subgroups: “Pass” firms that complied prior to the initial compliance test, “Fail-Pass” firms 
that failed the initial review (and, hence, received an “E” on their ticker symbol) but complied 
prior to the phase-in date, and “Fail-Fail” firms that had not complied by the phase-in, left from 
the OTCBB, but rejoined after complying within the next two months (see Panel B of Table 2). 
The last three columns of Table 5 report market-adjusted returns for this decomposition of 
the Newly Compliant group.  The Fail-Pass firms experience significant negative abnormal 
returns of -3.8% and -3.3% in the two weeks after receiving the “E” appended to their ticker 
symbol, reflecting the failed initial compliance test.  This negative return is recovered through 
positive abnormal returns in the weeks after the phase-in date.  The Fail-Fail firms experience an 
anomalous positive significant return during the week the failure of the initial compliance test is 
                                                 
28   These market-adjusted returns may be overstated by the use of the OTCBB market index.  Given these firms 
are now trading on the Pink Sheets, an index of Pink Sheet firms would be a more appropriate benchmark, but 
sufficient data is not available to compute a meaningful market return.  However, raw returns for 
Noncompliant firms are generally negative over this period, indicating a loss in market value. 
29   This finding is consistent with negative returns in prior work on delistings (e.g., Sanger and Peterson, 1990). 
However, in our setting, delistings occur as a consequence of a regulatory change rather than firms becoming 
bankrupt or violating extant exchange listing requirements.    26
announced, possibly indicating that these firms disclose their intention to eventually comply with 
the eligibility rule during this week.  Then, these firms experience a significant negative return of 
–5.8% during the week prior to the phase-in date, indicating that investors price firms’ 
noncompliance, even if it will be temporary.  Subsequently, these firms do not have significant 
abnormal returns until two months after the phase-in date, when these firms comply and rejoin 
the OTCBB. 
In summary, the return results are consistent with firms’ compliance choices.  This section 
suggests that market prices reflect costs and benefits to firms conditional on whether they 
comply with the imposed SEC disclosure requirements, and that the market recognizes positive 
externalities to disclosure regulation around key news announcements.  The results also indicate 
that while some of the benefits and costs are priced at the announcements leading up to the 
adoption of the eligibility rule, there are still significant returns in the weeks before the firm-
specific phase-in date.  This finding suggests that there exists residual uncertainty about whether 
firms will comply until the actual phase-in date. 
6.  Tests for changes in liquidity measures 
6.1  Data and variables 
We examine three different proxies for liquidity and trading activity around the introduction 
the eligibility rule to obtain a fairly comprehensive picture of liquidity changes.  First, we 
analyze the percentage bid-ask spread, computed as the difference between the bid price and the 
ask price, divided by the midpoint.  Second, we use monthly share turnover, computed as   27
monthly share volume divided by average total shares outstanding.
30  Finally, we examine the 
percentage of days traded during the month, calculated as the number of days in a month that a 
firm has nonzero volume divided by the number of trading days in the month, which may be a 
better proxy than share turnover in low-liquidity markets such as the OTCBB. 
We obtain data on our liquidity measures from multiple sources.  First, the Pink Sheets 
kindly provided concurrent closing bid and ask prices for two three-month intervals for most of 
our sample firms.  We obtain bid and ask prices for NASDAQ Small Cap firms from the Trade 
and Quote (TAQ) database.  As in the case of the return data, we collect daily volume, shares 
outstanding, and price data from Datastream, augmented with daily volume and price data 
provided by the Pink Sheets.  In the final dataset, we have spread data for 3,303 sample firms 
and trading data for 5,173 sample firms. 
6.2  Results for long-term shifts in liquidity 
We first examine whether there are any permanent shifts in liquidity measures around the 
introduction of the eligibility rule.  For percentage bid-ask spread, we compare the average 
spread in three-month intervals before and after the phase-in period (October – December 1998 
and 2000, respectively).  For share turnover and percentage of days traded, we compare monthly 
averages for six-month periods before and after the phase-in (December 1998 – May 1999 and 
December 2000 – May 2001, respectively).  We use the same calendar months before and after 
to ensure that the results are not affected by seasonal differences.  This approach also omits any 
                                                 
30   One problem in measuring turnover is that the beginning number of shares outstanding is often unreliable 
earlier in the data series.  We therefore adjust shares outstanding as described in footnote 17. To further 
mitigate the problem, we eliminate firms with market values below $100,000, as they are likely to result from 
an incorrect number of shares outstanding, and winsorize monthly share turnover at the 95
th percentile to 
remove outliers, resulting from a small denominator.  As a robustness check, we examine median monthly 
turnover and compute the log of monthly share volume without scaling by market value. In both cases, the 
results are very similar to those reported in Table 6.   28
abnormal and temporary liquidity effects during the phase-in period.  Those changes are 
examined in the next section.  We restrict the test to firms with at least one observation in each 
three-month (six-month) period to ensure the results are not driven by changes in the sample 
composition.  Otherwise, observed liquidity patterns could be simply due to attrition of sample 
firms caused by the eligibility rule. 
We perform this test on Already Compliant, Newly Compliant, and Noncompliant firms.  
We benchmark our results with the sample of NASDAQ Small Cap firms.  We test for shifts in 
the liquidity measures with the following regression: 
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where Avg. Liquidity Measurei = Three-month average of percentage spread, six-month average value of 
monthly share turnover, or six-month average value of percentage of days traded in the month for firm i; 
DNONi = 1 if firm i is a Noncompliant firm and 0 otherwise; DNEWi = 1 if firm i is a Newly Compliant firm 
and 0 otherwise; DALRi = 1 if firm i is an Already Compliant firm and 0 otherwise; DNQSCi = 1 if firm i is a 
NASDAQ Small Cap firm and 0 otherwise; and DPOST  = 1 if the average liquidity measure is from after the 
phase-in of the eligibility rule and 0 if the measure is from before. 
In this specification, the coefficients on the firm indicator variables (DNON, DNEW, and DALR) 
represent the group’s average level of the liquidity measure before the phase-in period.  A 
significant coefficient on the interaction between the firm indicator variable and the DPOST 
indicator variable suggests a significant shift in the liquidity measure for that group of firms in 
the post-phase-in period.  To ensure that market-wide movements do not explain the changes, we 
perform F-tests for differences in the coefficients across groups.
31 
                                                 
31   Even though each firm serves as its own control, we estimate this regression with controls for shifts in firm 
size (market value), shifts in return volatility (standard deviation of monthly returns), the phase-in month, and 
regulated industries (banks and insurance companies).  Inclusion of the first two controls is potentially 
problematic because changes in size and volatility could be additional consequences of the firm’s compliance 
decision, rather than exogenous alternative explanations for changes in liquidity.  Nevertheless, our results in 
this section remain significant when these controls are added.  We present results without controls to avoid 
endogeneity problems and allow for an assessment of the absolute magnitude of the changes in liquidity.   29
Table 6 presents the results of this regression.  The coefficient on the incremental level of 
liquidity in 2000/1 for Noncompliant firms (DNON*DPOST) is significantly positive in the bid-
ask spread regression, and significantly negative in the turnover and percent of days traded 
regressions.  Thus, Noncompliant firms exhibit significantly lower liquidity across all measures 
after the phase-in period, which is consistent with our expectation of lower liquidity in the Pink 
Sheets.  The changes appear also economically significant, as the incremental coefficients 
indicate a 12% increase in the percentage spread and an over 50% decline in share turnover.  The 
F-tests indicate that the changes in liquidity measures for Noncompliant firms are significantly 
different from the changes for the other groups.  These findings suggest economically important 
costs from the imposition of SEC disclosure regulation.
32 
For Newly Compliant firms, the coefficient on the incremental level of liquidity in 2000/1 
(DNEW*DPOST) is significantly negative for the percentage spread and significantly positive 
for the trading proxies.  Moreover, the magnitude of the changes is larger than for the other 
groups.  These findings are consistent with the substantial improvements in disclosure of Newly 
Compliant firms.  F-tests show that prior to the eligibility rule, Newly Compliant firms have 
significantly higher spreads and fewer days traded than Already Compliant firms.  These 
differences become insignificant after the phase-in period.  Thus, Newly Compliant firms not 
only experience dramatic increases in liquidity after adopting SEC disclosure regulation, but also 
achieve approximately the same level of liquidity as Already Compliant firms.
33 
                                                 
32   Due to the low stock prices of many OTCBB firms, the magnitudes of the mean spreads are quite large.  We 
also examine median spreads and find smaller magnitudes (e.g. 0.415 in 1999 for Noncompliant firms vs. a 
mean of 0.597).  All of the results in Table 6 are also statistically significant using medians (not reported). 
33   Although this result does not hold for share turnover, the log of monthly share volume exhibits the pattern as 
the other two liquidity proxies. Thus, the turnover pattern could be related to the difficulty of obtaining reliable 
shares outstanding estimates for these firms. See footnote 17.   30
Finally, the coefficient on the incremental level of liquidity in 2000/1 for Already Compliant 
firms (DALR*DPOST) is significantly negative for the bid-ask spread, significantly positive for 
share turnover, but insignificant in the days traded regression.  The results indicate that the 
positive externalities evidenced by the return findings stem in part from liquidity improvements.  
NASDAQ Small Cap firms in contrast exhibit significantly higher spreads and lower turnover in 
2000/1 compared to 1998/9.  Thus, the findings for liquidity improvements found for Already 
Compliant firms do not reflect time trends or economy-wide movements in liquidity.  Note, 
however, the higher level of trading activity is achieved through the same percentage of days 
traded, which is also constant for NASDAQ Small Cap firms over the same time period. 
6.3  Results for changes in liquidity around the phase-in month 
Next, we examine changes in liquidity measures in the months surrounding the firm-specific 
phase-in date.  This analysis allows us to tie the permanent shifts in liquidity documented above 
to the eligibility rule.  It also permits us to examine any other abnormal trading activity in firms 
around the phase-in dates.  
Figure 1b provides a timeline for these tests.  We define a month as 21 trading days.  The 
month ending with the phase-in date for each firm is defined as event month 0.  Unfortunately, 
we do not have bid-ask spread data to conduct these tests.  For the other proxies, we compute the 
monthly value of the liquidity measure starting in month -4 before to the phase-in date up to 
month +3 thereafter.  We perform this test by modifying the regression in equation (1) to include 
monthly indicator variables: 
it
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where Liquidity Measureit = monthly share turnover or the percent of days traded in the month for firm i in 
month t; DNONi = 1 if firm i is a Noncompliant firm and 0 otherwise; DNEWi = 1 if firm i is a Newly 
Compliant firm and 0 otherwise; DALRi = 1 if firm i is an Already Compliant firm and 0 otherwise; and 
DMONTHt  = 1 if the liquidity measure is from month t and 0 otherwise. 
We include values of the liquidity measures from four months prior to the phase-in date as a 
benchmark for the pre-event level of the liquidity measure.  Thus, a significant coefficient on the 
interaction between the firm indicator and the DMONTHt indicator variable suggests a 
significant change in the liquidity proxy for that group relative to month -4.  We omit the Small 
Cap firms because there is no event date for these firms. 
Table 7 presents results for this regression.  Overall, the levels of the liquidity measures are 
lower than those reported in Table 6 because, for this regression, we do not restrict the sample to 
firms for which we have two years of data.  Therefore, Table 7 regressions include smaller firms.  
Noncompliant firms exhibit a significant increase in trading activity for both proxies in the two 
months prior to the phase-in date.  This increased activity likely reflects investors rebalancing 
their holdings in anticipation of firms’ pending noncompliance and removal from the OTCBB, 
which is consistent with the abnormal return results documented in Table 5.  After the removal 
from the OTCBB, Noncompliant firms experience a significant decline in trading activity, which 
is consistent with our expectations and previous results. 
Newly Compliant firms exhibit a significant increase in trading activity two months prior to 
the phase-in date, i.e., shortly before the initial compliance test.  Liquidity continues to increase 
for both measures, peaking in the month of or after the phase-in date, and then slowly declines to 
roughly the incremental levels observed in Table 6.  This pattern likely reflects rebalancing due 
to the uncertainty about firms’ compliance and the fact that some firms in this group fail the 
initial compliance tests.   32
For Already Compliant firms, there is a significant increase in trading activity two months 
before the phase-in date that persists through the next five months.  As they have already been 
filing with the SEC, the liquidity improvements are likely to reflect positive externalities 
stemming from liquidity spillovers and an enhanced reputation of the OTCBB.  Comparing 
Tables 6 and 7 indicates that the increases in turnover and days traded are not sustained at this 
level in the long-run.  Thus, not all changes observed in Table 7 are likely to reflect externalities. 
In summary, the findings in this section suggest that the imposition of SEC disclosure 
requirements leads to significant liquidity increases for Newly Compliant and to a lesser degree 
for Already Compliant firms.  Thus, firms continuing to trade on the OTCBB garner significant 
and sustained liquidity benefits.  For firms that were already filing with the SEC, these benefits 
are consistent with the existence of positive externalities from imposing SEC disclosure 
requirements on other non-filing OTCBB firms.  The eligibility rule imposes costs on 
Noncompliant firms by forcing them into the Pink Sheets, where they experience significant and 
sustained decreases in liquidity after their phase-in date. 
6.4 Sensitivity  analyses 
Table 2 indicates that the phase-in schedules and the compliance rates are different for 
financial and non-financial firms.  Moreover, banks and insurance firms have special reporting 
obligations with their regulatory bodies, even prior to the eligibility rule.  We eliminate banks 
and insurance firms to see whether they affect our results.  Restricting the samples to non-
financial firms produces very similar results to those reported in Tables 4, 6 and 7. 
Furthermore, we are concerned about bankrupt firms in our samples.  These firms 
experience severe financial difficulties and often have been delisted from one of the major 
exchanges as a result.  For these reasons, bankrupt firms may be special case.  Therefore, we   33
exclude firms in bankruptcy proceedings, indicated by a “Q” at the end of their ticker symbol, 
from our samples.  We find that eliminating these firms yields essentially the same results as 
those reported in Tables 4-7. 
Finally, we address the issue that the Already Compliant group contains some firms that 
voluntarily adopted SEC filing prior to the introduction of the eligibility rule.  The concern is 
that results for the Already Compliant group reflect the change from voluntary to mandatory 
filing for those firms rather than externalities from the eligibility rule.  Note, however, that 
disclosure requirements, SEC enforcement, and legal liability are essentially the same for 
voluntary and mandatory filers (see Appendix).  Thus, it is not obvious what changes for 
voluntary firms. 
We classify firms as voluntary and mandatory filers in 1998.  Firms with 500 or more 
shareholders are clearly mandatory filers under Section 12(g).  Firms with fewer than 300 
owners of record are considered voluntary filers because Section 12(g) and 15(d) filing 
requirements can be suspended in this case.  Firms with between 300 and 500 owners can 
discontinue filing only if it is neither the year of the IPO nor total assets exceeded $10 million for 
the last three fiscal year ends.  However, as we do not have data on total assets for the last three 
fiscal years prior to 1998, we classify these firms once as voluntary and once as mandatory, and 
compare the findings.  Irrespective of the classification of this middle group, we find that both 
voluntary and mandatory filers exhibit similar decreases in the spreads and that their magnitudes 
are very close to those reported in Table 6, albeit at lower significance levels due to the reduced 
sample size.  For share turnover, mandatory filers exhibit smaller increases than voluntary firms.  
However, the magnitude of the incremental changes for the mandatory firms is still comparable 
to those reported in Table 6 (0.26 and 0.12 depending on the assignment of firms with 300 to 499   34
owners).  For the returns, we find similar results for voluntary and mandatory firms around the 
announcement and phase-in dates.  In summary, our evidence for the Already Compliant group 
does not seem to be driven by voluntary filers alone and continues to be consistent with the 
existence of positive externalities of disclosure regulation. 
7. Conclusions 
This paper examines the economic consequences of SEC disclosure regulation.  We exploit 
a recent regulatory change mandating firms on the OTC Bulletin Board to comply with the 
reporting requirements under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Prior to 1999, firms could be 
quoted on the OTCBB without filing with the SEC.  The eligibility rule eliminated this 
possibility and forced over 3,500 firms that were not previously filing with the SEC to either 
make the required disclosures or move to the Pink Sheets.  Firms already filing with the SEC 
were not affected by the rule.  We use this regulatory event, and the three groups created by it, to 
document firm-specific costs and benefits, as well as externalities, of disclosure regulation. 
The eligibility rule had rather dramatic consequences for the composition of the OTCBB.  
Almost 75% of the firms not previously filing with the SEC were removed from the market 
during the rule’s phase-in period and forced into the Pink Sheets, where they are not subject to 
SEC disclosure requirements and associated enforcement.  Thus, for the majority of OTCBB 
firms, the costs of SEC disclosure regulation outweigh the benefits.  Consistent with this 
interpretation, we find that Noncompliant firms are smaller, less leveraged, and more profitable.  
These results suggest that an important consequence of mandatory SEC disclosures is to push 
smaller firms with lower outside financing needs into a less regulated market, rather than to 
compel them to more disclosure.  This evidence is consistent with “crowding out” effects 
documented in prior work (Stigler, 1964; Jarrell, 1981) and shows that it is important to consider   35
firms’ responses to the imposition of disclosure regulation.  In this regard, the Pink Sheets may 
have played an important role.  The existence of this market likely prevented more firms from 
going private, but it may also have limited the number of firms that were compelled to adopt 
SEC disclosures. 
In terms of market responses, we examine returns around the key announcement and phase-
in dates of the eligibility rule.  The returns for the three groups are consistent with their prior 
disclosure strategies and their responses to the eligibility rule, indicating significant costs from 
the imposition of SEC disclosures for Noncompliant and Newly Compliant firms.  But we also 
find positive announcement returns for the Already Compliant firms, consistent with the 
existence of positive externalities. 
We also examine liquidity changes around the introduction of the eligibility rule to delve 
deeper into the sources of our return results.  The findings across all measures suggest that the 
imposition of SEC disclosures improves liquidity for firms that did not previously file with the 
SEC and adopt SEC disclosures.  Firms not complying with the eligibility rule experience 
permanent decreases in liquidity due their relegation to the less automated Pink Sheets.  We also 
find increases in liquidity for the Already Compliant firms, suggesting liquidity spillovers and 
enhanced market reputation as sources of the positive externalities.   36
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Appendix 
Market Characteristics, Disclosure Requirements, and Enforcement Rules  























































































































































































































































































































































































































NASDAQ Small Cap  All firms  Y  Y  Y  Y    Y  Exempt  Y    Y  Y  Y 




3 N  N  Y  Y    Y  Exempt  Y
3   Y  Y  Y 
OTCBB 
Before 1/4/99 
Non-SEC-filers N  N  Y  Y    N  Y  N    N N Y 
                          
OTCBB 
After 1/4/99 
All firms  N  N  Y  Y    Y  Exempt  N
6   Y  Y  Y 
        
                
Pink Sheets  Non SEC filers
4 N  N  N  N
5  N  Y  N    N  N  Y 
1  To continue trading on the NASDAQ Small Cap market, a firm must have a minimum bid price of $1.00, at least two market makers, at least 300 shareholders, and meet one of 
the following criteria: $2.5 million in shareholders’ equity, $35 million in market cap, or $500,000 in net income from continuing operations.  Listing fees for the NASDAQ 
Small Cap market include a $10,000 - $50,000 entry fee (based on shares outstanding) and at least $8,000 in annual fees. 
2   The Pink Sheets have no rules for quotes (they can be two-sided, one-side, or indicative only). On the OTCBB, market makers pay $6 per security per month, whereas on the 
Pink Sheets, market makers face a tiered fee schedule based on the total number of securities quoted. For this reason, it is generally cheaper for market makers to quote large 
numbers of low-volume stocks on the Pink Sheets than on the OTCBB.  In addition, market making on the OTCBB requires a NASDAQ terminal. 
3  SEC filers on the OTCBB before 1/4/99 would include Section 12(g) firms, Section 15(d) firms, and voluntary filers.  Section 12(g) firms are issuers with more than $10 million 
in total assets and at least 500 registered owners at the fiscal year end.  Section 15(d) firms are issuers that registered securities under the 1933 Act (e.g., offered more than $1 
million in equity).  Both Section 12(g) and Section 15(d) firms have to comply with the reporting obligations under the 1934 Act regardless of where they are quoted. Section 
15(d) filers, however, are exempted from the proxy and insider trading provisions. 
4   Mandatory and voluntary SEC filers on the Pink Sheets face the same disclosure requirements and enforcement rules as SEC filers on the OTCBB (see row 2). 
5   In June 2000, the Pink Sheets began to provide real-time electronic quotes for its market. 
6   Firms above the Section 12(g) limits continue to be subject to the proxy and insider trading provisions as indicated in the second row. 
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Figure 1 
Time-line for event study tests 
 













Figure 1b: Event months around the phase-in period for a 5/17/2000 phase-in date 
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 Note: An event month is defined as 21 trading days   40
Table 1 
Listing Statistics for OTC Bulletin Board firms 
 





after 1/4/99  Total 
Firms with primary domestic issues on OTCBB  6096  1581  7677 
- Inactive firms  -483  0  -483 
Firms subject to eligibility rule  5613  1581  7194 
      
Firms trading on OTCBB as of 6/30/01  1920  1136  3056 
Delisted due to Rule 15c (no active market maker)  99  59  158 
Delisted due to eligibility rule during phase-in  3190  0  3190 
Delisted due to eligibility rule after phase-in  399  286  685 
- Relisted after failure to comply with above rules  -361  -42  -403 
Listed on NASDAQ  127  47  174 
Listed on AMEX/NYSE  63  28  91 
Mergers and Acquisitions  131  37  168 
Bankruptcies and Liquidations  34  33  67 
Gone Private  10  0  10 
Suspended by SEC  13  3  16 
- Relisted after delisted for above reasons  -12  -6  -18 
Firms subject to eligibility rule   5613  1581  7194 
 
 
The table provides statistics for the numbers of issuers quoted on the OTC Bulletin Board between 1/4/1999 and 
6/30/2001. The statistics have been compiled from the archived daily lists of additions, deletions, and changes found 
at www.otcbb.com.     41
Table 2 
Compliance statistics for OTC Bulletin Board firms 
 






























Nonfinancial firms  4977  3436  1541  499  2040  2937 
(July 1999 – May 2000)    69.0%  31.0%  10.0%  41.0%  59.0% 
           
Financial firms  636  363  273  110 383 253 
(June  2000)    57.1%  42.9%  17.3% 60.2% 39.8% 
           
Total 5613  3799  1814  609  2423  3190 
    67.7%  32.3%  10.8% 43.2% 56.8% 
 
Panel B: Subsamples of firms based on compliance 
    Non-SEC-filers in 1998 
(n = 3,628) 
SEC filers in 1998 











Initial pass firms  1814  435    1379   
                
Firms that became compliant in review period  609  404      205 
         
Total issuers failed  3190         
   Complied within two months after failing    107      16 
   Never complied or complied after two months      2682    385 
Total 5613  946  2682  1379  606 
 
Panel A of the table provides phase-in statistics for issuers quoted on the OTC Bulletin Board and subject to the 
eligibility rule as of 1/4/1999.  The statistics were compiled from the archived daily lists of additions, deletions, and 
changes found at www.otcbb.com. Nonfinancial Issuers were assigned a phase-in date between July 1999 and May 
2000 based on the firm’s ticker symbol as of 1/4/1999.  The phase-in date is the date by which the issuer has to be 
compliant with the eligibility rule, i.e., has to be current in its filings with the SEC.  Issuers were reviewed 30 days 
prior to this date.  Banks and insurance companies were assigned phase-in dates in June 2000 and evaluated 60 days 
prior to this date.  Column 3 (4) reports the number of firms that passed (failed) the initial compliance test. Firms 
that initially failed, but complied within the 30- (or 60-) day review period are reported in column 5. Firms that 
failed to comply with the eligibility rule as of the phase-in date (column 7) were removed from the OTCBB, 
effective one day after the phase-in date.  Panel B of the table provides details on the composition of key subsamples 
of firms examined in the primary tests.  SEC filers include all firms that filed either a periodic report (any Form 10-
K, 10-Q) or a registration statement requiring financial statements during 1998.  Filing data was obtained from the 
SEC’s ftp site.  “Newly Compliant” firms consist of non-filers in 1998 that (1) adopted SEC filing prior to the 
phase-in period, (2) failed the initial compliance test but became compliant prior to the phase-in date, and (3) failed 
to comply with the eligibility rule prior to the phase-in date but did adopt SEC filing within the next two months and 
were reinstated to the OTCBB.  “Noncompliant” firms include all non-filers in 1998 that did not comply with SEC 
filing requirements in response to the eligibility rule and hence were dropped to the Pink Sheets.  “Already 
Compliant” firms are issuers that were already filing with the SEC in 1998 and passed the initial compliance test.  
“Delinquent” (“Terminated”) filers include firms filing with the SEC in 1998 that were not current in their filings at 
the initial compliance test, but became compliant (remained noncompliant) after the test.  These firms are dropped 
from the analyses. 
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Table 3 
Listing Choices and Firm Characteristics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for SEC-Filers vs. Non-SEC-filers and Newly Compliant vs. Noncompliant firms 
  SEC Filers    Non-SEC-filers    Newly Compliant (OTCBB)    Noncompliant (Pink Sheets) 
Variable  N  Mean Median  N  Mean  Median  N  Mean  Median  N  Mean  Median 
Share price  1642  6.840
  0.750  2617  8.947***  0.750***  687 12.496
  4.000  1930 7.683***  0.391*** 
Market value (000s)  1314  34135.8   8259.3   1096  35122.2  6776.4
***  438 62437.9
  24992.0
  658 16939.5
***  1210.0
*** 
Total assets (000s)  1862  51980.7   4588.0   794  40175.5
**  1126.2
***  423 49561.6
  1122.0
  371 29473.8
**  1141.1
 
Number  of  shareholders  1758 942.3  500.0   217 703.9***  388.0***  137 720.2
  378.0  80 676.1  389.5 
Capital  intensity  1803 0.224  0.121   753 0.221  0.103***  397 0.201
  0.078  356 0.244**  0.144*** 
Financial  leverage  1444 0.265  0.066   558 0.222  0.005
***  280 0.251
  0.007
  278 0.192
  0.003
 
Return on assets  1827  -1.158   -0.158   770  -1.955***  -0.284***  414 -2.200
  -0.343  356 -1.671  -0.255** 
Positive net income indicator  1890  0.318   0.000   913  0.276
**  0.000
**  493 0.268
  0.000
  420 0.286
  0.000
 
Bank & insurance indicator  1985  0.073   0.000   3628  0.135
***  0.000
***  946 0.267
  0.000
  2682 0.089
***  0.000
*** 
Panel B: Determinants of Firms’ Compliance Choices (Newly Compliant versus Noncompliant firms) 
  Newly Compliant=1  Newly Compliant=1  Newly Compliant=1  Newly Compliant=1 
  Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value 
Constant  -1.434 <0.001 -3.763 <0.001 -1.037  <0.001 -1.991  <0.001 
Months to phase-in date  0.058  <0.001  0.060  <0.001  0.080  <0.001  0.066  0.019 
Bank  &  insurance  indicator  0.412  <0.001 0.568  0.001 0.526 0.159 0.581 0.239 
Log Size (Share price)  0.136  <0.001  -  -  0.080  0.009  -  - 
Log Size (Market value)      0.310  <0.001  -  -  0.141  <0.001 
Financial  leverage       0.113  0.157  0.173  0.127 
Profitability       -0.336  0.026  -0.264  0.153 
McFadden R
2    0.120   0.225   0.049   0.063 
N    2617   1096   472   312 
***, **, *
  Significantly different from other group at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test and Wilcoxon test 
The table presents firm characteristics for SEC filers, non-SEC-filers, Newly Compliant and Noncompliant firms. Panel A reports univariate tests for differences in the means and 
medians. Panel B reports probit models for firms’ compliance choices. P-values are based on robust (Huber-White) standard errors. Share price and market value of equity are as of 
6/30/1999.  To correct for errors in the number of shares outstanding early in the data series, we use the shares outstanding as of the last day with Datastream data and multiply this 
figure by the split-adjusted price from Datastream or the Pink Sheets. Financial and ownership data are obtained from Global Access’ SEC database, Mergent’s FIS database, 
Knobias and SEC filings on EDGAR.  We combine the datasets to increase data availability. All financial and ownership data is measured as of the fiscal year end between July 1, 
1998 and June 30, 1999. For a small number of firms, we use financial data (3%) and number of shareholders (10%) from the previous fiscal year end because the desired year is 
missing. Capital intensity is measured as the ratio of plant, property and equipment to total assets.  Financial leverage is measured as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. The 
return of assets is computed as net income over total assets.  The indicator for positive net income equals one if net income is greater than zero and equals zero otherwise. The 
indicator for banks and insurance companies is obtained from the OTCBB’s webpage. We delete prices below $0.01 and market values below $100,000 as they are probably 
erroneous. We also delete 1% extreme observations on either side of the distribution, except when the variable is naturally bounded.   43
Table 4 
Mean Raw Returns around Eligibility Rule Announcement Dates 
 





























WSJ article hinting at 
changes  9/4/1997  0.018
*** 0.005
** †    0.011
*** 0.000   
†† 0.013
*** -0.002  0.001 
††  
NASD announces it 
may require filing   12/9/1997  -0.021
*** -0.028







*** ††  
NASD proposes rule 
change  2/13/1998  0.004 0.008




*** 0.010  -0.001 
† 
† 
NASD approves rule 
change  5/7/1998 0.001  0.012
***    0.011
** 0.013
† 
†   0.016
*** 0.020
** 0.009
*    
SEC approves 
eligibility rule  1/4/1999 0.055
*** 0.061







*** †††  
Mean Cumulative 
Return (all events)    0.056
*** 0.056







**b ††  
 
***, **, *
  Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05,  0.10 level, respectively, using a two-tailed test 
†††, 
††, 
†  Significant difference between groups at the 0.01, 0.05,  0.10 level, respectively, using a two-tailed test 
a, b  Significantly different from the mean cumulative returns for the NASDAQ Small Cap at the 0.05, 0,10 level, respectively, using a two-tailed test 
 
 
The table presents 5-day raw returns for key announcements related to the introduction of the eligibility rule. The 5-day buy-and-hold returns are compounded 
from day -3 to day +1 around the event date given in column 2 (excluding holidays).  The last row reports the cumulative return over the five event dates.  
Column 3 reports average 5-day return for a sample of firms listed on the NASDAQ Small Cap Exchange (619 firms).  Column 4 provides average 5-day returns 
for all OTC Bulletin Board firms (2391) for which we have price data for all five dates.  The “SC v BB” column indicates whether these returns are significantly 
different from each other.  The next two columns report the announcement returns for firms that filed with the SEC during 1998 (1124) and firms that did not file 
with the SEC during 1998 (1267).  See Table 2 for more details on the SEC filing.  The “SEC v. SC” (“SEC v. Non”) column indicates whether the returns of the 
SEC filers in 1998 are significantly different from the NASDAQ Small Cap firms (Non-SEC-filers in 1998).  The next three columns report announcement 
returns for Already Compliant firms (817), which are issuers that were already filing with the SEC in 1998 and which passed the initial compliance test; Newly 
Compliant firms (406), which include all non-SEC-filers in 1998 that adopt SEC filing because of the eligibility rule; and Noncompliant firms (861), which 
include all non-SEC-filers in 1998 that did not comply with SEC filing requirements and hence were dropped to the Pink Sheets.  The “Alr v. New” (“New v. 
Non”) column indicates whether the returns for Newly Compliant group are significantly different from the returns for the Already Compliant (Noncompliant) 
group. 
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Table 5 
Mean Monthly and Weekly Market-Adjusted Returns around Phase-in Dates 
 
         Newly  Compliant  Firms 
Trading Days  






Compliant   Pass  Fail-Pass  Fail-Fail 
(-86, -66)  0.018  0.018  -0.011    -0.011  0.039  0.020 
(-65,  -45) -0.018  0.021 -0.012   0.021  0.032 -0.010 
(-44, -24)  0.008  0.017  -0.040
***   -0.039  0.032  0.091 
              
Announcement (-23, -19)  0.005  0.010  -0.007    0.009  -0.002  0.047
** 
Effective “E”    (-18, -14)  0.011
** 0.005  -0.006    0.013  0.000  -0.004 
(-13, -9)  0.013
** -0.020
** -0.031
***   -0.001  -0.038
*** -0.013 
(-8, -4)  0.003  -0.020
*** -0.051
***  0.011  -0.033
*** -0.058
*** 
Phase-in date       (-3, +1)  -0.004  0.008  -0.021
***   -0.002  0.013  0.017 
(+2, +6)  0.013
** 0.001  -0.023
***  0.005  0.009  -0.034 
(+7, +11)  0.009  0.026
*** -0.021
***   -0.007  0.060
*** 0.005 
(+12, +16)  0.001  0.026
*** -0.003   0.006  0.041
*** 0.028 
              
(+17,  +37) -0.007 -0.010 -0.086
***   -0.045  -0.018  0.081 
(+38,  +58) -0.018  0.007 -0.033
**   -0.111
*** 0.040  0.142
** 
(+59, +79)  -0.022  -0.065





  Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05,  0.10 level, respectively, using a two-tailed test 
 
 
This table presents the mean market-adjusted returns for months and weeks before, during, and after the phase-in of 
the eligibility rule.  Day 0 is the phase-in date for each firm.  See figure 1 for a timeline.  Market-adjusted returns are 
buy-and-hold firm returns minus buy-and-hold returns on an equally-weighted market index of all firms in the 
OTCBB.  The Announcement week is when the OTCBB posts whether the firms have passed the initial compliance 
test and the Effective “E” week is when the firms that have not yet complied begin to trade with an “E” appended to 
their ticker symbols.  The sample is comprised of Already Compliant firms (1251 firms), which are issuers that were 
already filing with the SEC in 1998 and which passed the initial compliance test; Newly Compliant firms (625), 
which include all non-SEC-filers in 1998 that adopt SEC filing because of the eligibility rule; and Noncompliant 
firms (2129), which include all non-SEC-filers in 1998 that did not comply with SEC filing requirements and hence 
were dropped to the Pink Sheets.  The Newly Compliant group is further broken down into Pass firms, which 
adopted SEC filing prior to the phase-in period (240), Fail-Pass firms, which failed the initial compliance test but 
became compliant prior to the phase-in date (285), and Fail-Fail firms, which failed to comply with the eligibility 
rule prior to the phase-in date, but adopted SEC filing within the next two months and were reinstated to the OTCBB 
(100).  Because they had a 60-day period between the Effective “E” date and the Phase-in date, rather than a 30-day 
period, Banks and Insurance Companies are dropped from this analysis.   45
Table 6 
Long-term Shifts in Liquidity Measures 
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Panel A: Regression coefficients: 
 Average  Liquidity  Measure 
Firms and time periods  Bid-ask Spread  Monthly Turnover (%)  Percent of Days Traded 




















  Incremental level in 2000/1  -0.064
*** 0.297
** -0.001 








Panel B: F-tests for differences in coefficients 
Difference in Incremental Levels:  Bid-ask Spread  Monthly Turnover (%)  Percent of Days Traded 




















Already Compliant – NASDAQ Small Cap -0.158
*** 1.131
*** 0.008 
Difference in 1998/9 Levels:       








Newly Compliant– Already Compliant  0.093
*** -0.091  -0.082
*** 
Difference in 2000/1 Levels:       








Newly Compliant– Already Compliant  -0.032  0.310
** -0.014 
***, **, *
  Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05,  0.10 level, respectively, using a two-tailed test 
 
The table presents results from a regression of average liquidity measures on indicators for firm type interacted with 
the period of the average liquidity measure.  The Bid-ask Spread is computed as the difference between the closing 
bid and ask prices, divided by the midpoint of the spread.  Monthly Turnover (%) is computed as monthly share 
volume divided by average monthly shares outstanding, times 100.  Percent of Days Traded is the percentage of 
trading days in a month with nonzero volume.  Noncompliant firms (1093-1587 firms) include all non-SEC-filers in 
1998 that did not comply with SEC filing requirements and hence were dropped to the Pink Sheets (sample sizes 
differ for each dependent variable). Newly Compliant firms (614-630) are non-SEC-filers in 1998 that adopt SEC 
filing because of the eligibility rule.  Already Compliant firms (1186-1051) are firms that were already filing with 
the SEC in 1998 and passed the initial compliance test.  NASDAQ Small Cap firms (406-555) are a sample of firms 
from that exchange.  The spreads (turnover and days traded) are averaged over the three-month (six-month) period 
Oct.-Dec. 1998 (Dec. 1998-May 1999), before the eligibility rule phase-in, and Oct.-Dec. 2000 (Dec. 2000-May 
2001), after the completion of the phase-in.  Firms must have observations in both periods to be included in the 
sample.  The Incremental Level in 2000/1 indicates the difference in the average liquidity measure between 1998/9 
and 2000/1.  Panel A presents regression coefficients and Panel B presents F-tests comparing coefficients.     46
Table 7 
Monthly Changes in Liquidity Measures around Phase-in Date 
it
t
t i t i
t
t i t i
t
t i t i it
DMONTH DALR DALR
DMONTH DNEW DNEW DMONTH DNON DNON easure LiquidityM
ε β β
β β β β
+ +


















*                                          
* *
 
 Average  Liquidity  Measure 
Firms and time periods 
Monthly  
Turnover (%)  Percent of Days Traded 
Noncompliant in month -4  1.041
*** 0.291
*** 
  Incremental level in -3  0.041  0.007 
  Incremental level in -2  0.187  0.023
** 
  Incremental level in –1  0.302
*** 0.040
*** 
  Incremental level in 0  0.371
*** 0.048
*** 
  Incremental level in +1  -0.068  -0.013 
  Incremental level in +2  -0.322
** -0.061
*** 




Newly Compliant in –4  1.990
*** 0.443
*** 
  Incremental level in -3  0.254  0.013 
  Incremental level in –2  0.591
*** 0.029 
  Incremental level in –1  0.790
*** 0.043
** 
  Incremental level in 0  1.103
*** 0.053
*** 
  Incremental level in +1  0.812
*** 0.055
*** 
  Incremental level in +2  0.658
*** 0.054
*** 
  Incremental level in +3  0.472
** 0.047
** 
Already Compliant in -4  2.023
*** 0.500
*** 
  Incremental level in -3  0.208  0.010 
  Incremental level in –2  0.485
*** 0.027
* 
  Incremental level in –1  0.945
*** 0.049
*** 
  Incremental level in 0  1.039
*** 0.062
*** 
  Incremental level in +1  1.192
*** 0.066
*** 
  Incremental level in +2  1.006
*** 0.073
*** 





***, **, *  Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively, using a two-tailed test 
 
The table presents results from a regression of monthly liquidity measures on indicators for firm type interacted with 
the month of the liquidity measure.  Monthly Turnover (%) is computed as monthly share volume divided by 
average monthly shares outstanding, times 100.  Percent of Days Traded is the percentage of trading days in a month 
with nonzero volume.  Noncompliant firms (2404 firms) include all non-SEC-filers in 1998 that did not comply with 
SEC filing requirements and hence were dropped to the Pink Sheets.  Newly Compliant firms (894) are non-SEC-
filers in 1998 that adopt SEC filing because of the eligibility rule.  Already Compliant firms (1387) are firms that 
were already filing with the SEC in 1998 and passed the initial compliance test.  The time periods range from four 
months before the phase-in month (the benchmark period) to three months after the phase-in month (see figure 1 for 
timeline).  The Incremental Level in –t indicates the difference in the liquidity measure between month –4 and 
month –t.   The columns provide the coefficients of the regression, which indicate the magnitudes of the level or 
incremental level of the liquidity measures.   